i89.
See Douglas N. Walton (1995), A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy, pp 65–67; Charles Leonard Hamblin (1970), Fallacies, pp 31–32; and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1992), Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies, pp 103, 133, 205 and 214. These authorities all agree with Irving Copi’s argument in (1953), Introduction to Logic, that just about any fallacy can be seen as Ignoratio elenchi in some sense. An “elenchus” is also used as the name for a form of Socratic refutation which shows the interlocutor that what he thinks he knows is inconsistent with his other opinions—it doesn’t join up. This is used as a means to spur him on to think again—as distinct from a “sophistic” argument, which aims to refute the opponent by any means. See also David Hackett Fischer (1970), Historians’ Fallacies, p 284.